For its part, the IMF has responded to recent criticism and reformed its policies in some key areas, such as public relations and conditionality terms for gaining access to IMF credit. The IMF's tone has become considerably more diplomatic and conciliatory.
One might argue that commentators should now suspend judgment and give these changes time to take effect.
I am not so sure. This paper argues that deeper changes still are required. To this extent, I am in the company of many of the recent IMF reports. But not necessarily for the same reasons. I hope to bring a different perspective to the debate. Most critics have assessed the IMF globally, from a primarily economic slant. Their main concern is whether what the IMF does actually works. This paper focuses on the specific (but often overlooked) intersection between the IMF and foreign investment, and takes a primarily legal approach. 5 My main concern is whether IMF conditionality is good investment regulation.
This topic is important for two reasons. First, foreign investment is the major driver of the world economy, already eclipsing trade in goods as a determinant of global economics. 6 But, compared to trade law, its rules are unclear. 7 Examining the IMF's . 5 That is not to say there is no work on the legal aspects of the IMF. The writing of Sir Joseph Gold, General Legal Counsel for the IMF from 1960 to 1979, is well known and is discussed infra in Part III. 6 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TABLES 10 and Table 1 .2 (2002), which states that the world economic slowdown in 2001 was "largely driven by investment cycles". Trade in services (which includes forms of investment) grew faster than trade in goods over the 1990s and has now overtaken trade in goods as factor of a country's GDP. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69 and 71 (2002) . See also WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 128 (2003) , which shows that FDI inflows are growing much faster than exports and output in developing countries. traditionally adopted a narrower view, tending to think of regulation as referring to technical rules of public law enforced by government, or semi-autonomous, agencies.
15
This divergence underscores the point that different legal tools may sometimes achieve similar economic effects. A form of regulation well-known to economists, but perhaps less so to lawyers, is regulation by appropriation -or regulation through conditionality on credit disbursement. This "soft" regulation is a way of influencing indirectly what an entity may not wish, or be able, to control directly. 16 Regulation by appropriation can be seen at all levels of society. Every business which has negotiated finance realizes the power that the bank's loan conditions place on operations. The same is true for individuals or organizations who receive government grants tied to specific conduct criteria.
17
Regulation by appropriation also exists on a municipal and national level, whenever one political entity is dependent upon funding from another political entity. In the United States, the terms of federal grants have led to much jurisprudence and commentary on the scope of the "spending clause" in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Under this provision, the Federal Government may tax and 16 For example, Albert Rosenthal poses the question in the context of U.S. Federal grant disbursement as "…whether the federal government could constitutionally regulate matters otherwise beyond its power, through the device of attaching conditions to expenditures of money….As with most difficult, and therefore interesting, legal questions, the answer is not 'always' or 'never', but 'sometimes' or 'it depends'." Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1103 REV. , 1161 REV. (1987 . 17 In the U.S., conditions on federal grants to individuals or organizations may be struck down if these conditions require the individual or organization to relinquish a constitutional right. appropriate funds to the several states for the "general Welfare" of the Union. But federal grants are usually conditioned on the states implementing certain policies. In this way, grants are used as tools for the Federal Government to seek through indirect pressure results which it cannot command through law. 18 In one notable example, after the Supreme Court struck down a federal law banning guns in school zones, 19 President
Clinton announced that he would achieve the same result indirectly through the spending clause. 20 I will return to the U.S. analogy later in this paper.
And of course regulation by appropriation exists too on an international level, whenever funds given to a country -whether pledged by another country, a private donor or an international organization -are conditional on performance. Obviously there will be differences in the strength, coerciveness and effect of different donor conditions. So terming all conditional credit disbursement soft regulation is not to make a value judgment about its legitimacy. It is merely to use consistent taxonomy.
The IMF is a leading administrator of regulation by appropriation through its conditionality policies. Over time, its conditions have embraced broad aspects of a country's legal and economic development. Even through the IMF has no specific brief 18 See. to control foreign investment, its expansive view of its mission has led it to focus on investment as an important engine of economic growth.
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B.
What is the IMF, and What Does it Do?
The IMF was the central achievement of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.
22
The IMF's Articles of Agreement (the "Articles") created, for the first time, a codified international monetary system, designed to prevent the economic disintegration of the interwar years. The IMF's purposes are defined in Article I and require the IMF, among other things, "to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation".
23
Exchange stability was to be achieved in two ways. First, the IMF Articles mandated a fixed (but adjustable) "par value" system of exchange rates. 24 Once set, each member was required to maintain that par value, through intervention in the market if 21 necessary. 25 Secondly, the IMF could lend money to members to help them deal with temporary balance of payments deficits in a manner which (unlike, for instance, a sharp tightening of monetary or fiscal policy) would not be "destructive of national and international prosperity". 26 In short, the IMF's role was to be something between an international credit union and an international reserve bank.
Over time, the functions of the IMF have evolved. The par value system collapsed in 1971. 27 Despite attempts at revival, the international monetary system now works on floating rates determined by market forces. The IMF has adapted by changing its role from a provider of short-term funds under fixed exchange rates to a manager of world financial crises and a long-term lender to developing countries.
The IMF has also developed its drawing rules. On joining the IMF, each member is assigned a quota which determines both its contribution to and ability to draw on the IMF General Reserve Account ("GRA"), as well as its voting rights. 28 From the outset, contributions have been paid in the proportions of one-quarter hard assets (gold, or the IMF's currency, Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs")), and the remainder in members' own currencies. 29 This first quarter, known as the "reserve tranche", may be automatically drawn on. 30 A member may also draw up to 200% of their quota through accessing so-25 IMF Articles, IV(3). The fixed value of a currency could, however, be altered in the event of a "fundamental disequilibrium". IMF Articles, IV(5). 26 IMF Articles, I(v). Note that the legal form of the transactions is not a loan, but rather a purchase of a foreign freely-transferable currency (such as U.S. dollars) with a member's own currency, coupled with an obligation for the member to repurchase its own currency with the foreign currency within a specified timeframe. The economic effect is, however, equivalent to a loan. 45 The GATS applies to all "trade in services" which phrase is defined to include four modes of supply. Mode 3, "supply of a service…by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member" encompasses many forms of FDI: GATS, I(2)(c). The GATS has specific application to financial services. See GATS, Annex on Financial Services, Art. 5. The TRIMS essentially clarifies obligations existing in the GATT: See TRIMS, 2 and Annex. 46 Another such instrument is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") Non-Binding Investment Principles. 
IMF debtors
The chart shows that only the norms of international customary law and the WTO instruments have genuine range of application. Both require, however, only modest degrees of liberalization. Customary international law on investment is still stuck in a century-old debate as to the proper level of compensation for expropriation, and WTO coverage of investment is patchy -catching only investment incentives and FDI through provision of services -and is largely voluntary, depending on country decisions to schedule obligations.
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BITs are bilateral treaties, and so have necessarily limited coverage. They are usually signed between developed and developing countries and exist in such numbers that most countries are party to at least one BIT. They do not usually require broad-based liberalization, merely preferential investment treatment. They are, however, not always equal and do not always provide reciprocal obligations on both sides. 48 In many ways they are an asymmetrical instrument produced by heavily weighted bargaining power.
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The coverage of the remaining entries is demarcated on developmental lines. On the one hand there are the "rich" clubs, which include the OECD, NAFTA and the EU.
Of these instruments, the OECD Code is not a binding treaty and does not require compliance -it is more of a "best efforts" prescription. NAFTA Chapter 11 resembles a more comprehensive BIT in terms of obligations. The EU investment regime is more comprehensive again. Indeed, the EU takes a general exception to the OECD Code so as to provide preferential treatment to its members. There are two important points. First, structural reforms, such as privatization, are not called for. Second, each instrument is exempt from the MFN discipline and benefits members only. Liberalization efforts are reciprocated by other attractive countries. 47 An important feature of the GATS is that it operates on a "positive list" approach, which means that a member is not bound in respect of any service sector unless it has listed this sector in a schedule. Even once a sector is listed, exceptions can also be taken against specific GATS requirements. 48 The IMF cannot correct this asymmetry, which is a harsh geo-political reality.
But it should be careful not exacerbate it. Arguably IMF conditionality prevents IMF debtors from being able to join multilateral systems by bargaining their barriers down.
The IMF would likely argue that it is only through capital account liberalization that a country can achieve the sort of growth which would make it an attractive treaty partner. specific Codes -rather than requiring unilateral reform. The IMF could also play a policy role in suggesting templates for possible treaties and advising drafters.
B. The Legality of IMF Investment Regulation through Conditionality
(1) New IMF Conditionality Guidelines
As a response to criticism such as that from Goldstein, the IMF's 2002
Conditionality Guidelines are intended to signal a new, back to basics, approach. To this end, they make reference to concepts such as "parsimony" in the choice and amount of conditions and the need for country "ownership" of reforms. The Guidelines provide that programs should be directed primarily towards the twin goals of solving a member's balance of payment problems, and "achieving medium-term external viability while fostering sustainable growth". 55 Conditions should be imposed only if they are of "critical importance" in achieving these goals, in monitoring progress, or in implementing the IMF Articles "or specific policies adopted under them". In general, "all variables and measures that meet these criteria will be established as conditions".
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Guideline 7(b) sets specific criteria. Conditions will "normally" consist of macroeconomic variables and structural measures that fall within the IMF's "core areas of responsibility" -defined as "macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, including the underlying institutional arrangements and closely related structural measures; and financial system issues related to the functioning of both measures. At any rate, the IMF may impose conditions outside of its core areas; but this "may require more detailed explanation of their critical importance".
Taken as a whole, the Guidelines appear to impose an administrative rather than a jurisdictional fetter on the IMF. Moreover, they are not very dissimilar from the 1979
Conditionality Guidelines which provided that:
58 Performance criteria will be limited to those that are necessary to evaluate implementation of the program with a view to ensuring the achievement of its objectives. Performance criteria will normally be confined to (i) Indeed, whereas in 1979 non-core conditions could only be imposed in "exceptional cases", non-core conditions today can be imposed after "more detailed explanation of their critical importance". So the exceptionality threshold has been dropped. The view that the Guidelines are largely an administrative statement of intent is strengthened by the fact that much of the rhetoric advocating parsimony and ownership appears not in the Guidelines proper, but in an annexed Staff Statement on the "Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality".
It is interesting that the Guidelines do not ringfence any specific type of condition as outside the IMF's mandate. The concession is one as to degree (less conditions, imposed only when necessary) rather than kind (conditions must be of types A and B but not of types C and D). Other comparable institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, have a more heavily "legal" constituency and are careful to avoid charges of excessive jurisdiction. This is reflected not only in their day-to-day operations, but also in the sort of institutional conduct which is tolerated. In the WTO, members fight tightly pitched legal battles over the meaning of terms such as "like product" or "least restrictive means" to determine whether a regulatory measure is WTO-consistent or not. 63 The institutional balance between the members (as legislators) and the Appellate Body (as the judiciary) is also closely monitored.
The analogy between the IMF and the United Nations is even sharper. Both were intended to ensure a period of peace and cooperation: the one through international political cooperation and restrictions on the use of force; the other through international monetary cooperation and restrictions on the use of exchange controls. But the U.N. has always been subject to tighter legal scrutiny. Its powers to intervene in conflicts such as 
(3) Looking Closely at the IMF's Articles of Agreement
My particular focus is whether the IMF has the power to prescribe investment terms as conditions for receipt of IMF funds. 64 There is some writing on the IMF's lack of jurisdiction over capital flows. 65 It is evident that the IMF has sought, but does not yet have, such power. 66 The real issue is whether conditionality policies illegitimately circumvent this rule. I argue that they do.
The IMF has six core purposes, set out in Article I. These are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 64 As far back as 1977, Joseph Gold, the IMF's former General Counsel, wrote: "The negotiators of the Fund's Articles decided that members would retain substantial authority over capital movements. Marginal authority was conceded to the Fund in the form of certain discretions. There has been no disposition to extend this authority by amendment. The Fund has not exercised the discretions expressly conferred on it, but its influence in practice, although far short of managerial, has probably exceeded the role foreseen for it by the founding fathers. This influence, as it true of other activities of the Fund, has been exercised by means of surveillance, consultation and persuasion, and, not least, by the creation of a body of principles for the use of its resources." Gold, supra note 60, 50-51. 65 See, supra, notes 59 through 62. 66 See, Fischer, supra note 59, 2; and Holder, supra note 61. Note that the IMF Interim Committee's proposed, in a Communiqué of 8 April, 1998, to amend the Articles to make capital account liberalization a specific purpose of the IMF. This amendment was never effected. The Fund can, however, request a member to impose exchange controls if the member appears to be using Fund resources to meet a "large or sustained outflow of capital", which is forbidden: Article VI(1).
unemployment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. This means that the conditionality (and all other) rules for the PGRF are entirely administrative in nature and are subject only to the limitation that they be consistent with the IMF's purposes.
Lending under the GRA is further clarified by Article V(3) which elaborates on purpose (v). Article V(3)(a) provides that the Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements "that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund".
Article V(3)(b) sets the conditions for members' access to the GRA. It provides that a member is "entitled" to make a purchase (drawing) from the Fund under the following conditions, of which (iii) and (iv) can be waived:
(i) the member's use of the general resources of the Fund would be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the policies adopted under them;
(ii) the member represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves;
(iii) the proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or would not cause the Fund's holdings of the purchasing member's currency to exceed two hundred percent of its quota;
(iv) the Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Article, Article IV, Section 1, of Article XXVI, Section 2(a) that the member desiring to purchase is ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.
Reading section 3(b) one might conclude that, provided the four conditions are satisfied, a member is "entitled" draw on the GRA. This is not how the IMF has interpreted the Articles. 67 Through extensive use of conditionality policies, the IMF has effectively removed any sense of entitlement to draw beyond the reserve tranche. There must be some limits however. For starters, the phrase "adequate safeguards" implies that conditions should be directed at ensuring repayment, not at an exogenous reform agenda. This is so even if "adequate safeguards" is read in the context of Article I(v)'s reference to preventing resort to destructive measures. Secondly, the concept that a member is entitled to purchase cannot be entirely undermined by restrictive conditions. Such an interpretation would be mischievous. Further, implicit in the proviso to Article I, in Article V(3)(b)(i) -and in the very notion of the rule of lawis the concept that the IMF's own policies must be in accordance with the Articles. This conclusion is spelled out in relation to non-GRA lending, which must be "consistent with the purposes of the Fund".
My thesis drives off this last point, and is that IMF investment regulation is inconsistent with the IMF Articles. This is because the IMF Articles remand capital transfers to member control. Article VI(3) provides that "[m]embers may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements…". This is in direct contrast to the rule in Article VIII(2)(a) that "…no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions". The combination of these two rules is at the heart of the IMF's jurisdiction: the IMF has authority to regulate current transactions, 71 but not capital account movements.
(4) The Two Key Questions
There are then two questions to answer. First, what types of policies concern capital account movements? Secondly, does it follow that an IMF conditionality policy concerning capital account movements, whether under the GRA or not, is illegal?
As to the first question, Article XXX provides that: (1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
71 In relation to current transactions, members must avoid both restrictions and discriminatory practices with respect to current transactions. Articles VIII(2) and (4). 72 Though, again, note the IMF's ability to request capital controls to prevent member misuse of IMF Funds. Supra, note 65.
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments; (4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.
In essence, this provides that a payment is on current account if the underlying transaction for which the foreign currency is bought or sold involves good or services for which the prompt payment is made between a resident of the country concerned and a non-resident. 73 Paragraphs (2) and (3) give the IMF some limited jurisdiction over the proceeds of an investment, and also connected payments for interest and amortization purposes. But, these aside, payments on capital account are outside the bound of the IMF. 
(a) A domestic law analogy -the U.S. spending clause
The United States case law on the spending clause -noted earlier -may be helpful for sharpening analysis of essentially the same issue under the IMF Articles.
Relatively early case law resolved an ancient debate between two framers of the U.S.
Constitution, Madison and Hamilton, over whether the spending clause, which permitted
Congress to tax (and, implicitly, apportion) for the "general Welfare" of the Union, 82 was wider in scope than Congress' specifically enumerated powers. 83 The Court decided
Hamilton was correct in arguing that the spending power was indeed wider. 84 A key reason was that th e words "general Welfare" would otherwise be redundant. 85 This view has been stoutly affirmed. Relevantly, the leading case, South Dakota v. Dole, held that the spending power could prescribe conditions relating to liquor licensing, a matter which is explicitly remanded to states by the Twenty-first Amendment. a member seeking to draw on general funds must provide "adequate safeguards". 90 The pertinent concern is not that "adequate safeguards" would be rendered r edundant if this phrase excluded capital movements. The real concern is the contrary: that this phrase could be inflated so as to include the only matter which is expressly withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the IMF. Unlike the case of the spending clause, there is no reason to adopt this perverse interpretation. If it is adopted, the IMF is simply enforcing through the backdoor what it cannot require directly.
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The only lever for such an overbroad interpretation of "adequate safeguards" is the reference to capital in Article IV(1). However, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 92 supports the view that Article IV(1) does not dilute Article VI(3).
As Gold has himself acknowledged, Article IV(1) is not written as a firm obligation, but only as a desirable goal of the international monetary system. 93 Whatever the purpose of the reference to capital in Article IV(1), it was surely not to override the express power over capital movements given to members by Article VI(3).
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Second, U.S. jurisprudence is informed by a naïve view that conditionality is not necessarily regulation. The premise is that, if the state can refuse the grant, the result is a free bargain. 95 Gold's argument is nearly identical: that conditionality does not 90 Articles I(v) and V(3)(a). 91 The present Deputy General Counsel for the IMF has some sympathy for this view: see Holder, supra note 61. 92 Article 31(1) provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 93 See Gold, ASPECTS, supra note 69, 121. Gianviti appears to agree, describing Article IV(1) as a "soft law" obligation only. Supra note 60, 12. 94 Moreover, such an argument does not sit well with the IMF's 1997 proposal to amend the Articles to make capital account liberalization a purpose of the IMF. See supra note 66. Neither Holder nor Gianviti express conviction that, absent an amendment, the IMF can legally require liberalization of capital inflows through conditionality policies. See supra notes 60 and 61. 95 See, e.g., Kansas v. U.S., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1199 (D. Kan. 1998) ("Plaintiff is required only to choose between receiving federal funds and complying with certain statutory mandates, or not receiving such "regulate" anything because it is the result of agreement. However, as Epstein has shown, real world bargains often involve coercion; especially when there is unequal bargaining power. 96 It does not help to try to discern precisely when persuasion becomes compulsion (it is this chimerical search which has led to an incoherent U.S. coercion test).
The flaw is the diametric opposition between bargain and coercion. Formally, there is always a choice, even if practically there is none. A more realistic approach is to abandon this false dichotomy. Many bargains are coerced. The essence of regulation is not the subject's lack of choice but the official's aim -to alter the subject's behavior.
Regulation by appropriation -while involving agreement, and therefore an instrument of soft and not hard law -is regulation nonetheless.
The better view, then, is that IMF conditionality is an indirect form of regulation, in that it requires certain conduct in exchange for funding needed to finance acute payments deficits. 97 Once this is appreciated, the clear opposition with Article VI(3) is apparent. Members have the sole right to regulate capital transactions. Yet conditionality policies prescribing investment liberalization also regulate capital transactions. Therefore such IMF policies interfere with members' autonomy. This conclusion applies equally to GRA and non-GRA lending. In relation to both, the IMF is regulating capital transactions -something it has no mandate to do -and thereby acting inconsistently with the Fund's purposes. STATE (1993) . Epstein gives the following example of such a bargain. A robber tells a victim "your money or your life" (40). The victim is "free to reject the threat and to face the use of force" (41). Epstein notes earlier that most taxation and other regulation is in the form of a bargain: "…if you choose to earn or sell, then we will take so much from you" (11, emphasis in original). 97 The word "needed" should be emphasized. IMF funding is much more crucial to debtor countries than federal funding is to U.S. states. States can tax their citizens to make-up budget shortfalls. Not so indigent debtor countries -this is precisely why they need IMF assistance.
Putting everything together, I argue for the following propositions: (e) Therefore, the IMF cannot legally condition access funds on implementation of the investment liberalization formula.
C. The Legitimacy of IMF Investment Regulation
Concerns about the legitimacy of IMF conditionality have been widely voiced and the arguments are well-known. Mostly, the arguments arise out of the tension between a state's right to economic sovereignty 98 and the IMF's right to demand adequate safeguards for repayment. In this section I examine some general arguments and explain how they specifically relate to the IMF's intervention in investment. 98 The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974) provides that "Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever".
It is hard to deny the IMF's "mission creep" since its inception. The European Union, collectively, also has a veto.
The day to day affairs of the IMF are managed by its Executive Board. Western governments and with the profit motives of Western multinational companies. 100 The vision of the IMF as a technical body also arguably explains why the IMF's requirement to pay due regard to members domestic politics (see Articles IV(3)(b) and XII (8)) is weaker than the equivalent provision found in the UN Charter (2(7)) or in the World Bank's Articles (V(10)). Unlike the latter two bodies, the Fund had a specific and non-political task -regulating exchange rates. It was not envisaged the IMF would become deeply mired in designing domestic policies. The alternative explanation -that the IMF could interfere with domestic politics but the UN and the World Bank were prohibited from such interference -is unconvincing. 101 Article XII(5 There is some evidence IMF conditionality has, in specific cases, been driven by the wishes of G-7 countries. 104 This is not surprising. Capital flows today connect the world:
both developed and developing. Forty five percent of global output comes from developing countries, which also attract more than one third of foreign investment inflows. 105 Integrated capital markets mean that developed countries have a genuine economic interest in influencing the investment regimes of the developing world. The IMF's governance structure makes this only too possible.
This leads back to the problem of asymmetry. 106 The IMF's shift in focus has effectively transferred regulatory power from the developing to the developed world, thereby exacerbating an already unequal situation. Whereas rich countries control their own economies, poor countries are gradually ceding such control to international financial institutions, especially the IMF. As stated, since 1977 no developed country has applied for an IMF loan and therefore been subject to IMF conditionality. 107 In contrast, the need of developing countries for long-term balance of payments support has grown considerably.
This asymmetry contributes to the growing inequality in global finance.
Countries at the centre of the global economic system are able to lend and receive loans in their own currency (e.g., the U.S., Europe, Japan). Countries at the periphery have to borrow in the currencies of the major players and are subject to the increased financial pressures this entails. IMF conditionality is intricately involved in this process because the IMF is a credit flagship for the private sector. If the IMF won't lend, nobody else (including the World Bank) will lend not invest. 108 Should the IMF suddenly call in a loan or refuse to release the next tranche, private lenders and foreign investors presently operating in the country will likely pull out also, triggering a financial collapse. So a poor country needing credit often has no realistic choice but to accept IMF conditionality.
The IMF is not just one lender amongst others. It is the leader.
(2) Conceptual Problems of Conditionality
As described above, conditionality is a difficult regulatory concept. To understand it, one must understand the complex relationship between the IMF and a debtor country. The two do not stand in definite opposition. Often the country wishes to reform and the IMF provides the technical guidance to help the reform to succeed.
Nevertheless, there is something about regulation through conditionality which poisons the outcome.
One way to try to understand the concept of conditionality is using Max Weber's theory about the effect of power on behavior. 109 Weber argued that power exists in an infinite variety of forms -legal, economic, social. Economic power typically involves domination through a "constellation of interests" (i.e., two parties act to further their own self-interests, but these intersect in such a way that party A gains some control over party B's conduct: e.g., a standard bank loan There is already literature on the latter term. Some tends to suggest that country ownership can be attained simply by the IMF focusing more strongly on this goal.
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Other commentators recognize the complexity of the concept -"ownership" must be defined, even then it is not observable, and there are multiple dynamic actors -but conclude that it is achievable in practice through the right conditionality policies. of being a debtor subject to the demands of the IMF, the developing country is a signatory, equal in status and bound to the same set of rules as all other signatories.
(3) Conditionality and Democracy
A core problem with conditionality, then, is that it is not conducive to healthy democracy. Issues that would usually be at the centre of democratic debate are simply removed from the table. A country reliant on the IMF is bound to follow certain paths in relation to many of the most pressing issues concerning its population: taxes, foreign investment, social welfare, land distribution, privatization. This means that, no matter which party is in power, the agenda on important points is fixed.
This leads to elections being trivialized through candidates campaigning not on serious policy differences but on minor or personality issues. Conditionality can also contribute to darker problems, such as corruption.
Conditioned policies naturally dilute accountability on the part of both domestic politicians and IMF officials. This point has been recognized in the U.S. spending clause jurisprudence. 113 If policies do not work out, it is always possible for the domestic politicians to blame the IMF, and vice versa. 114 This attribution of blame is sometimes unfair and is usually unproductive. In some cases the lack of clear accountability lines permits corrupt or inefficient politicians to escape public scrutiny and censure.
Developing countries are developing in every sense of the word. Their economic institutions are developing, and their political structures are often fledgling democracies.
A recent study has shown that new democracies are inherently fragile and often do not last long. 115 One might argue that, by requiring a range of fixed measures held in place by external mechanisms, the IMF is financing economic reforms with political capital.
The result might be that the reforms fail, not because they were the wrong medicine, but because they fractured the incipient democracy and plunged the country into chaos. Perhaps this thesis can be taken a step further. Chua argues that liberalization of investment markets and privatization of state assets can destabilize already fragile developing countries, leading to revolution and reversal of reforms. Arguably, the problem is exacerbated if the legitimacy of the reforms is questioned from the outset.
Even if pursued unilaterally, the investment liberalization formula is risky.
Conditionality simply raises the ante.
D. The Effectiveness of IMF Investment Regulation
For foreign investment reforms, as for many things, the devil is in the detail. macroeconomic policy, arguably the difference between success and failure lies in the intricate grassroots decisions which require local knowledge. There is unlikely to be any "off the rack" policy which will work for every nation. The IMF has been accused by many prominent economists of pursuing policies which lack the finesse and detail required. 118 If this is true, the IMF is not to blame. It is hard to design successful reform through macroeconomic variables alone. Nevertheless, if the design of foreign investment regimes is heavily influenced by the IMF, legitimate questions can be asked about likely success rates.
This is not an academic concern. There are huge risks in mismanagement.
Investment flows are more volatile in developing than in developed countries. 119 Capital market liberalization had tragic consequences for the Asian Tigers. Privatization of water supply was not successful in Bolivia. Foreign direct investment in Nigeria's oil reserves has not greatly benefited its country's citizens. Foreign investment liberalization can hurt an emergent economy as well as help it.
Moreover, as Russian privatization has shown, the political will for extensive reforms is not inexhaustible. It is important to get reforms right the first time around.
Getting an investment climate right is harder than simply deregulating capital inflows.
Other factors, such as good governance, the rule of law, competition rules, clear property rights, are also required. 120 Arguably both unilateral reform (with proper advice), or a treaty model, are better than reforms urged through conditionality, because they are more likely to attract the necessary political will.
The most damning effectiveness problem, though, is that IMF conditionality programs are too short. 121 SBAs last for eighteen months and EFF facility loans for three years. The PGRF facility, which is directed to structural reform, is also only three years with a possible one year extension. Given the decades, and sometimes centuries, developed countries took to become open market economies, these timeframes seem extremely ambitious. A palpable risk is that, in order to complete the reform cycle -and be repaid the money it loaned -the IMF is tempted to roll-over loans and effectively lend money to a country to pay itself back with. This ties uncomfortably back into Weber's theory of power. The IMF's mandate for "temporary" assistance simply does not lend it to structural reforms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Few now debate the economic benefits of foreign investment. The important question is the framework, and the rules, under which this should take place. At present these rules are piecemeal. This article has argued that IMF conditionality is a flawed regulatory tool and should not be permitted to entrench itself as part of a new investment framework.
A number of long-term investment frameworks are possible but none are closely on the horizon. One proposal would be for the IMF to continue its sophisticated technical assistance programs to countries seeking to liberalize investment, but not make participation a condition of finance. Another would be the negotiation of a new MAI 121 See KENEN supra note 3, 110.
